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Abstract — Security of wireless sensor network 
(WSN) is always considered a critical issue and has 
a number of considerations that separate them 
from traditional wireless sensor network. First, 
sensor devices are typically vulnerable to physical 
compromise. Second, they have significant power 
and processing constraints. Third, the most critical 
security issue is protecting the aggregate output of 
the system, even if individual nodes may be 
compromised. While a variety of security 
techniques are being developed and lots of 
researches are going on security fields. In this 
paper we have proposed a new technique to 
provide data authentication and privacy in faster, 
scalable and cost effective way.  
Keywords:  Wireless sensor Network, Block Cipher, 
Mode of Operation, Link Layer, MISTY1, OFB. 
1. Introduction 
Wireless sensor networks are application dependent 
and primarily designed for real-time collection and 
analysis of low level data in hostile environments. 
Popular wireless sensor network applications include 
wildlife monitoring, bushfire response, military 
command, intelligent communications, industrial 
quality control, observation of critical infrastructures, 
smart buildings, distributed robotics, traffic 
monitoring, examining human heart rates etc. 
Majority of the sensor network are deployed in hostile 
environments with active intelligent opposition. 
Hence security is a crucial issue for such type of 
applications.  One obvious example is battlefield 
applications where there is a pressing need for secrecy 
of location and resistance to subversion and 
destruction of the network [4]. The wireless medium 
is inherently less secure because its broadcast nature 
makes eavesdropping simpler. Any transmission can 
easily be intercepted, altered, or replayed by an 
adversary. The wireless medium allows an attacker to 
easily intercept valid packets and easily inject 
malicious ones.  
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Encryption and authentication using cryptographic 
techniques makes a system significantly more secure 
against eavesdropping and other attacks. Encryption 
can be used to keep data secure from the adversary, 
and authentication can be used to safeguard against 
spurious data. In essence, these techniques attempt to 
ensure system-level confidentiality by protecting all 
links. 
The security issues in WSN are more challenging than 
those in traditional wired networks. Most sensor 
networks actively monitor their surroundings, and it is 
often easy to deduce information other than the data 
monitored. Such unwanted information leakage often 
results in privacy breaches of the people in the 
environment. Moreover, the wireless communication 
employed by sensor networks facilitates 
eavesdropping and packet injection by an adversary. 
The combination of these factors demands security for 
sensor networks at the time of design to ensure 
operation safety, secrecy of sensitive data, and privacy 
for people in sensor environment [1]. Significant 
efforts and research have been undertaken to enhance 
security levels of wireless networks.  
Security in sensor networks is complicated by the 
constrained capabilities of sensor node hardware and 
the properties of the deployment [1], [2] and [3].  
Depending on application we are being motivated to 
propose efficient and effective block cipher 
architecture of link layer security in a wireless sensor 
network. Effective eavesdropping can be prevented in 
wireless sensor network with faster and cost effective 
way with a minimum good security like 
message/entity authentication or a combination of 
confidentiality and authentication. This new class of 
networks closely resembles the behavior of wireless 
networks. Nevertheless, they have a few unique 
differences; the principal one is the small size of 
Nodes constituting a WSN. Although smaller nodes 
make WSNs suitable for several existing and 
emerging applications related to information sensing, 
this also implies that the nodes have limited resources, 
like CPU speed, memory, battery, and radio interface. 
Because the nodes are resource constrained, they 
require network designs that can be customized for 
different types of application environments, thus 
placing significant demands on algorithm design, 
protocol specification, and technologies.  
Sensor networks simplify the simultaneous collection 
and organization of data from multiple locations, 
  
which may be unreachable, inhospitable, or even 
hostile environments. Merging wireless 
communications with sensor network capabilities 
enables rapid deployment and reduces the cost of the 
infrastructure. However, adopting wireless 
communications introduces a new set of challenges.  
Sensor nodes are susceptible to physical capture, but 
because of their targeted low cost, tamper-resistant 
hardware are unlikely to prevail. Sensor nodes use 
wireless communication, which is particularly easy to 
eavesdrop on.  
Attacker can easily inject malicious messages into the 
wireless network.  
Anti-jamming techniques such as frequency- hopping 
spread spectrum and physical tamper proofing of 
nodes are generally impossible in a sensor network 
due to the requirements of greater design complexity 
and higher energy consumption.  
The use of radio transmission, along with the 
constraints of small size, low cost, and limited energy, 
make WSNs more susceptible to denial-of-service 
attacks.  
Ad-hoc networking topology of WSN facilitates 
attackers for different types of link attacks ranging 
from passive eavesdropping to active interfering.  
Most current standard security protocols were 
designed for two-party settings and do not scale to a 
large number of participants.  
There is a conflicting interest between minimization 
of resource consumption and maximization of security 
level.  
Since sensor nodes usually have severely constrained 
applications. Thus, a promising approach is to use 
more efficient symmetric cryptographic alternatives. 
Instead, most security schemes make use of 
symmetric key cryptography. One thing required in 
either case is the use of keys for secure 
communication. Managing key distribution is not 
unique to WSNs, but again constraints such as small 
memory capacity make centralized keying techniques 
impossible. 
In section 2 we discussed the related works. Our 
proposed model for a new link layer security scheme 
is described in section 3. We have a discussion in 
section 4. Finally the paper concludes with the idea 
for future advancement in section 5. 
 
2. Related Works 
TinySec [5] is link layer security architecture for 
wireless sensor networks, implemented for the 
TinyOS operating system. In order to overcome the 
processor, memory and energy constraints of sensor 
nodes TinySec leverages the inherent sensor network 
limitations, such as low bandwidth and relatively short 
lifetime for which the messages need to remain 
secure, to choose the parameters of the cryptographic 
primitives used. TinySec has two modes of operation: 
authenticated encryption (TinySec-AE) and 
authentication only (TinySec-Auth). With 
authenticated encryption, TinySec encrypts the data 
payload and authenticates the packet with a message 
authentication code (MAC). The MAC is computed 
over the encrypted data and the packet header. In 
authentication only mode, TinySec authenticates the 
entire packet with a MAC, but the data payload is not 
encrypted. 
 An important feature of TinySec is its ease of use and 
transparency, as many application developers will 
either implement the security features incorrectly or 
leave out any security entirely if the security API is 
difficult to use. TinySec solves this problem by 
integrating into TinyOS at a low level. 
MiniSec [6] is a secure network layer protocol that 
claims to have lower energy consumption than 
TinySec while achieving a level of security which 
matches that of Zigbee. A major feature of MiniSec is 
that it uses offset codebook (OCB) mode as its block 
cipher mode of operation, which offers authenticated 
encryption with only one pass over the message data. 
Normally two passes are required for both secrecy and 
authentication. Another major benefit of using OCB 
mode is that the ciphertext is the same length as the 
plaintext, disregarding the additional fixed length tag, 
four bytes in MiniSec’s case, so padding or ciphertext 
stealing is not necessary. Another primary feature 
MiniSec has over the other security suites mentioned 
here is strong replay protection without the 
transmission overhead of sending a large counter with 
each packet or the problems associated with 
synchronized counters if packets are dropped. To 
achieve this MiniSec has two modes of operation, one 
for unicast packets MiniSec-U and one for broadcast 
packets, MiniSec-B as explained. 
Exploring security issues in wireless sensor networks, 
and in particular, we propose an efficient link layer 
security scheme inspired by TinySec [5]. To meet the 
desideratum of minimizing computation and 
communication overhead, our focus is the CBC-X 
mode Encryption/Decryption algorithm, which 
enables encryption/decryption and authentication of 
packets a One-pass operation. In particular, the main 
contributions of the paper are as follows: 
We present an efficient link layer security scheme that 
attains confidentiality and authentication of packets in 
wireless sensor networks. Security services are 
provided transparently to the upper (link) layers of the 
protocol stack. We devise a CBC-X mode symmetric 
key mechanism to implement our link layer security 
scheme. Encryption/Decryption and authentication 
operations are combined as a one-pass Operation, 
which reduces half of the computational overhead of 
computing them separately. 
 The padding technique makes the scheme have no 
cipher text expanding for the transmitted data payload. 
  
Hence it significantly reduces communication 
overhead. 
Clearly, the CBC-X mode symmetric key mechanism 
in combination with the padding technique enables 
our scheme to substantially save power consumption 
of sensor nodes. 
 
2.1 Problem statements 
A wireless sensor network (WSN) is a network 
comprised a large number of sensors that are 
physically small Communicate wireless among each 
other and are deployed without prior knowledge of the 
network topology. Due to the limitation of their 
physical size, the sensors tend to have storage space, 
energy supply and communication bandwidth so 
limited that every possible means of reducing the 
usage of these resources is aggressively sought. 
Typical wireless sensor networks comprise of the 
wireless sensor nodes logically interconnected to each 
other, to realize some vital functionality. Wireless 
sensor nodes are characterized by severe constraints in 
power, computational resources, memory, and 
bandwidth and have small physical size with low 
power consumption. Since the Processing of the data 
is done on-the-fly, while being transmitted to the base 
station, the overall communication costs are reduced. 
Due to the multi-hop communication and the process 
demanding applications, the conventional end-to-end 
security mechanisms are not feasible for the WSN. 
Hence, the use of the standard end-to-end security 
protocols like SSH, SSL or IPSec in WSN 
environment is rejected. Instead, appropriate link layer 
security architecture, with low associated overhead is 
required. There are a number of research attempts that 
aim to do so. 
 
3. Proposed Model 
Cryptographic algorithms are an essential part of the 
security architecture of WSNs, using the most 
efficient and sufficiently secure algorithm is thus an 
effective means of conserving resources. By 
‘efficient’ in this paper we mean requiring little 
storage and consuming less energy. The essential 
cryptographic primitives for WSNs are block ciphers, 
message authentication codes (MACs) and hash 
functions. Among these primitives, we are only 
concerned with block ciphers in this paper, because 
MACs can be constructed from block ciphers [7] 
where as hash functions are relatively cheap [8]. 
Meanwhile, public-key algorithms are well-known to 
be prohibitively expensive [9]. 
The most important parameters of a block cipher are 
 The key length (which determines the block 
length) it supports, 
 The word size and 
 The nominal number of rounds. 
The notable ones are TinySec [5], Flexisec [10] and 
MiniSec[6]. These link layer security protocols have 
an open-ended design so as to enable the use of any 
block ciphers with appropriate mode of operation. 
Also, the range of applications for which the WSNs 
can be used is very wide. Hence, in order to optimize 
the security levels- desired vs. resource-consumption 
trade-off, the link layer security protocol employed 
must be configurable with respect to (a) the actual 
cipher and the mode of operation to be employed and, 
(b) The security attributes desired such as encryption, 
message authentication or replay protection.  
We believe that the efficiency of the block cipher is 
one of the important factors in leveraging the 
performance of the link layer protocol. Even though 
the Skipjack (80-bit cipher key with 64-bit block size) 
[11] is the default block cipher used by TinySec and 
MiniSec; We have attempted to carefully investigate 
the applicability of   block cipher Mistyl (128-bit 
cipher key with 64-bit block size) [12] and OFB 
against the Cipher Block Chaining (CBC) [13] mode 
as the desired Block cipher mode of operation. 
In this paper, therefore, we present our study and 
analysis results which “The Misty cipher in the OFB 
mode” over Rijndael, Skipjack cipher in CBC mode, 
as the baseline to evaluate. 
We believe that the actual cipher to use with a specific 
mode of operation to be employed must be arrived at 
only looking after and considering the specific 
security demands of the applications, rather than by 
following any abstract model. Therefore, for the 
resource constrained issue in WSN environment “The 
Misty cipher in the OFB mode” implementation and 
evaluation exercise could be useful in arriving at the 
choice of the block cipher to be in tune with the 
available resources and the type of the security 
desired. 
TinySec employs link layer encryption with Skipjack 
as the default cipher with Cipher Block Chaining 
(CBC) mode and CBC-MAC (Message 
Authentication Code) [13]. TinySec exploit the 
advantage of implementing link layer security in 
software by providing minimal configurable security 
attributes. The configurable security allows different 
modes of operations and support for (a) encryption 
and authentication (b) only message authentication 
(provided by default) or (c) disabling the security 
support altogether. Thus it does not support the 
configurable link layer security.  
MiniSec that is designed for the Telos motes [14]. It 
uses a different approach in that it offers two 
operating modes. It offers all the basic desired link 
layer security properties viz. data encryption, message 
integrity and replay protection. 
In general, the block ciphers used for evaluation in 
WSN environment are RC5 [15], Rijndael [16], 
MISTY1 [18]. There have been many benchmarks and 
evaluation of the block ciphers for the WSNs as 
  
surveyed here. But none of them focus specifically on 
the security at the link layer framework. The 
evaluation is based on security properties, storage and 
energy efficiency of the ciphers. The results prescribe 
Skipjack (low security at low memory), MISTY1 
(higher security at low memory) and Rijndael (highest 
speed but higher memory) as the most suitable ciphers 
depending upon the availability of memory and the 
required level of security. Another attempt at 
evaluating the security mechanisms in WSNs  
measurements like (a) the impact of packet overhead 
on energy consumption (b) the impact of different 
ciphers on the CPU and memory usage (c) the impact 
of security layer (including cipher) on the 
message/network throughput, on the network latency 
and on the energy consumption. We believe that the 
size of the cipher key is an indicative measure of the 
strength of the computational security of the cipher. 
At the minimum, the cipher key size must be enough, 
so as to prevent the brute force attack against the 
cipher. With the rapid advancement in technology, the 
conventional key size of 80-bits is longer sufficient. 
As per the claims of RSA Security Labs, 80-bit keys 
would become crack able by 2010 [17]. Hence, it is 
essential to move towards ciphers with 128-bit cipher 
key sizes. Our selection is the encryption algorithm 
MISTY1 is a 64-bit block cipher with 128-bit key 
MISTY1 was designed on the basis of the theory of 
“provable security” against differential and linear 
cryptanalysis. It was also carefully designed to 
withstand various cryptanalytic attacks that were 
known at the time of designing.MISTY1 working fine 
with OFB mode of operations so we select OFB mode 
of operation. 
A MISTY blocks cipher with OFB mode of operation 
should be used to implement link layer security 
scheme. To encrypt message longer than block size, a 
mode of operation is used, also these operation modes 
do not only affect the security, but also the energy-
efficiency of the encryption scheme. The fault 
tolerance against cipher text error and synchronization 
error (where bit must be added or lost) must also be 
taken into account. 
Secret-key cryptosystems MISTY1, which is a block 
ciphers with a 128-bit key, a 64-bit block and a 
variable number of rounds. MISTY is a generic name 
for MISTY1. Designed on the basis of provable 
security theory, against differential and linear 
cryptanalysis, and moreover they realize high speed 
encryption on hardware platforms as well as on 
software environments. With software implementation 
eight rounds can encrypt a data stream in CBC mode 
at a speed of 20Mbps and 40Mbps on 
Pentium/100MHz and PA-7200/120MHz, 
respectively. For its hardware performance, a 
prototype LSI by a process of 0.5CMOS gate-array 
and confirmed a speed of 450 Mbps. MISTY1 can 
encrypt a data stream in OFB mode with faster speed 
than CBC mode. 
MISTY is to offer secret-key cryptosystems that are 
applicable to various practical systems as widely as 
possible, for example software stored in IC cards and 
hardware used in fast ATM networks. To realize this, 
following three fundamental policies are followed: 
 MISTY should have a numerical basis for its 
security 
 MISTY should be reasonably fast in software 
on any processor 
 MISTY should be sufficiently fast in 
hardware implementation.  
3.1 Security analysis 
We have chosen to evaluate MISTY1 
becauseMISTY1 is one of the CRYPTREC 
recommended 64-bit ciphers. MISTY1 is designed for 
high-speed implementations on hardware as well as 
software platforms by using only logical operations 
and table lookups. We have also found MISTY1 to be 
particularly suitable for 16-bit platforms. It is a 
royalty-free open standard documented in RFC2994. 
Security Babbage and Frisch demonstrate the 
possibility of a 7th order differential cryptanalytic 
attack on 5-round MISTY1, none of the S-boxes with 
optimal linear and differential properties has an 
optimal behavior with respect to higher order 
differential cryptanalysis, however as improvement, 
the number of rounds of the FI function could be 
increased. MISTY1 has four instead of three S-boxes 
in its FI function. Mr.K¨uhn found an impossible 
differential attack on 4-round MISTY1 using 238 
chosen plaintexts and 262 encryptions. In the same 
paper, a collision search attack has also been 
described – the attack requires 228 chosen plaintexts 
and 276 encryptions. In a later paper, Mr.K¨uhn shows 
that the FL function introduces a subtle weakness in 4-
round MISTY1. This weakness allows him to launch a 
slicing attack with as few as 222.5 chosen plaintexts 
on 4-round MISTY1. The best known attack on 5-
round MISTY1 so far is Knudsen and Wagner’s 
integral cryptanalysis [19], at a cost of 234 chosen 
plaintexts and 248 time complexity. 
Skipjack is 80 bit key and 64 bit block cipher with 32 
rounds. The cipher key size must be enough, so as to 
prevent brute force attack against the cipher. Skipjack 
is low security at low memory. The major limitation 
of TinySec is its limited platform support; the official 
release of TinySec as included in version 1 of TinyOS 
only works on the MICA2 mote.  The current release 
of MiniSec also suffers from some implementation 
flaws which artificially limit the length of the 
802.15.4 packets by overloading the length field. 
Furthermore MiniSec overloads a bit in the packet 
header that CC2420 datasheet specifies as reserved 
and should always be set to zero. This can lead to 
unpredictable operation if MiniSec requires this field 
to be set to 1. In terms of encryption/decryption 
Rijndael offers the highest speed at the expense of 
  
relatively large code size and data memory 
requirement.  
To conclude, the security margin provided by 
MISTY1 is relatively small compared with modern 
128-bit ciphers like Rijndael, but with nominal rounds 
MISTY1 is still reasonably secure. 
 
3.2 Efficiency analysis and experiments 
In this section we show one Example of hardware 
implementation of MISTY1 with eight rounds. 
Hardware 
We have also designed a prototype LSI of MISTY1 
with eight rounds, which has the following 
specifications: 
Encryption speed 450 mbps 
clock 14 MHz 
I/O(plain,cipher ,key) 32 bit parallel_3 
Supported Modes ECB,CBC,OFB-64,CFB 
Design process 0.5µ CMOS gate-array 
Number of gates 65K gates 
Package  208-pin at package 
 
This LSI has no repetition structure that is; it contains 
the full hardware of eight FO functions and ten FL 
functions. It takes two cycles to encrypt a 64-bit 
plaintext; it also has three independent 64-bit registers 
that store a plaintext, an intermediate text after the 
fourth round, and a cipher text, respectively. This 
structure makes the following pipeline data processing 
possible:  
                            
cycles Plain 
text1 
Plain 
text2 
Plain 
text3 
Plain 
text4 
Cycles 
1 & 2 
Input Encryption Input  
Cycles 
3 & 4 
 Encryption Input  
Cycles 
5& 6 
Output Output Encry
ption 
Input 
Cycles 
7 & 8 
Input Encryption Input  
 
 
3.3 Size and speed analysis 
Memory 
We refer to two types of memory: (1) code memory, 
in the form of Flash memory and (2) data memory, in 
the form of RAM. The memory organization of 
MSP430F149 is such that data memory ranges from 
address 0200h to 09FFh, where as code memory 
ranges from 01100h to 0FFFFh. There are three types 
of segments for this platform: CODE, CONST and 
DATA. A typical policy is such that CODE and 
CONST segments are put in the code memory, while 
DATA segments (CSTACK, DATA16 AN, DATA16 
I, DATA16 N, DATA16 Z and HEAP) in the data 
memory. For the memory usage of CODE and 
CONST segments, we can read it off the memory map 
listing generated by the compiler. For the memory 
usage of DATA segments except CSTACK, we can 
also read it off the memory map listing. For CSTACK 
however, we have to rely on manual inspection of the 
code, and our estimation is conservative. The storage 
for plaintext, cipher text, cipher key as well as the 
expanded key is not included in the code memory or 
data memory in Table 1. The module named ‘skey’ in 
Table 1 and other tables hence forth Refers to the key 
expansion algorithm The code memory for an 
operation mode module, say a CBC module, takes into 
account the code memory for the bare bone encryption 
code, the CBC code as well as the S-boxes (or lookup 
tables in general).  
CPU Cycles 
The computational complexity of an algorithm 
translates directly to its energy Consumption. 
Assuming the energy per CPU cycle is fixed, and then 
by measuring the number of CPU cycles executed per 
byte, we get the amount of energy consumed by byte. 
For example, the processor used, MSP430F149 draws 
a nominal current of 420μA at 3V and at a clock 
frequency of 1MHz in active mode – this means that 
the energy per instruction cycle (for the processor 
alone) is theoretically 1.26 nJ. The results can be 
found in Table 2. Observe that among all modes; only 
CBC is asymmetrical in the sense that encryption and 
decryption consume a slightly different number of 
CPU cycles. From Table 1 and 3, we can see that OFB 
is not only the most space-saving but also the fastest 
mode. 
Table 1:  Memory Requirements in bytes. 
 
     
  
Table 2: CPU cycles for key expansion (Per key) and 
operation Mode (per byte). 
 
 
With MISTY cipher CBC consumes 478 cpu cycles    
for encryption and MISTY with OFB consumes 445 
cpu cycles for encryption. If we use MISTY  with 
CBC then code memory required 6973 and data 
memory required 58, but with OFB code and data 
memory requirement is less than CBC mode with 
MISTY cipher. So in term of speed optimization also 
MISTY with OFB mode of operation is a better 
option. 
In terms of key setup, MISTY1 is an attractive option 
with the least data memory requirement and CPU 
cycles, and modest code memory requirement. In 
terms of encryption/decryption, Rijndael offers the 
highest speed at the expense of relatively large code 
size and data memory requirement.  
MISTY1 is a solid performer in all categories, never 
falling below the 3rd place, from these two tables we 
can see that MISTY takes very low code memory 
compare to Rijndael and also in case of data memory 
MISTY takes first place for size optimized. If size 
optimized then sensor node size can be small in shape 
and also we can get high security with low memory 
compare to Rijndael and skipjack. 
Table 3:  CPU cycles for Key expansion (Per Key) 
and Operation Mode (Per byte). 
 
 
4. Discussion 
Cryptographic algorithms are an essential part of the 
security architecture of WSNs, using the most 
efficient and sufficiently secure algorithm is thus an 
effective means of conserving resources. By 
‘efficient’ in this paper we mean requiring little 
storage and consuming little energy. Data 
transmission consumes more energy than 
computation. MISTY1 depending on the combination 
of available memory with required security is good for 
storage and energy efficiency. OFB is not only the 
most space-saving but also the fastest mode. Some 
sensor network only needs data integrity, availability, 
confidentiality and semantic type security. These 
types of sensor networks only needs to reduce power, 
storage and cost, as well as with a good security. If we 
can implement block cipher in hardware then speed 
will increase also, so after consider all these factors 
we propose an efficient size optimized, low cost, 
scalable and secured schemes that can make primarily 
privacy, integrity and availability of packets in 
wireless sensor network. 
By scalable we mean that, MISTY is one of the 
earliest block ciphers that were aimed at being 
suitable for both software and hardware system, 
particularly for low cost applications. It was designed 
so that in real world encryption performance could be 
achieved even in heavy resource constrains.  
By Low cost we meant, MISTY can implemented 
with a very small RAM size (e.g. within 100 bytes) 
with software in cheap processor and with a small 
number of gate counts and low power consumption 
(e.g. within 10 gates) in hardware. 
A large number of sensor nodes are deployed and the 
MAC scheme must establish the communication link 
between the sensor nodes. We present the challenges 
in the design of the energy efficient medium access 
control (MAC) protocols for the wireless sensor 
network. These Wireless Sensor Networks have 
severe resource constrains and energy conservation is 
very essential. The sensor node’s radio in the WSNs 
consumes a significant amount of energy. Substantial 
research has been done on the design of low power 
electronic devices in order to reduce energy 
consumption of these sensor nodes. Because of 
hardware limitations further energy efficiency can be 
achieved through the design of energy efficient 
communication protocols.  
We propose an efficient link layer security scheme in 
this paper. It is efficient in cipher computation. By 
using the MISTY-OFB  mode encryption mechanism 
and the IV techniques proposed scheme takes very 
low memory size and also code size, MISTY cipher 
works very fast with OFB mode of operation so it can 
significantly decrease sensor node size  which is of 
great important to wireless sensor networks like 
environmental application. MISTY-OFB takes very 
small space but provides security like confidentiality, 
data integrity, data freshness and primary privacy of a 
  
network which are important concern for 
environmental WSN network. Sensor network is 
application specific, size and cost optimization with 
required security service is our work. 
For example, a typical environmental or habitat 
monitoring applications like (a) tracking the 
movement of an animal in a sanctuary or (b) 
monitoring the amount of rainfall in the catchments 
areas of a river across a dam, to enable forecasting the 
probability of rainfall downstream, the confidentiality 
of data packets transmitted to the base station is not 
essential but the data integrity, entity authentication, 
message freshness and replay protection are very vital 
for the applications.  
 
5. Conclusion and future work 
About the operation mode to use, Apart from having 
the highest memory and energy efficiency, OFB has 
desirable fault-tolerance characteristics, i.e. a cipher 
text error affects only the corresponding bit(s) of the 
plaintext. Therefore in an error-prone environment 
such as the wireless network, OFB is particularly 
useful. However in the event of loss of 
synchronization, OFB has to rely on an external 
mechanism to regain synchronization.  
For truly constrained environments, we recommend 
MISTY1. Although MISTY1 is slower than Rijndael, 
in terms of key setup, MISTY1 uses less memory and 
CPU cycles than Rijndael does. Furthermore, 
MISTY1 uses less RAM for encryption, not to 
mention that the overall code size of MISTY1 is half 
of Rijndael’s. The only drawback of MISTY1 is that it 
is (believed to be) less secure than Rijndael and it only 
caters for one key length, but we foresee that there are 
applications that do not require a security level higher 
than MISTY1 can provide. 
In conclusion, we have presented taking into account 
the security properties, storage- and energy-efficiency 
of a set of candidates; we have arrived at a 
systematically justifiable selection of block ciphers 
and operation modes. Instead of taking for granted 
prevalent suggestions, we now have results that we 
can use not only for convincing ourselves but also 
other researchers in the area of WSN. 
Experiments show that the proposed scheme is more 
efficient than TinySec. Future work is to implement 
this scheme with TOSSIM simulator to compare 
energy-efficiency, power consumption and cost size 
with other security work like TinySec, Minisec, 
Sensec, and Flexisec. This work is more effective for 
environmental type sensing network. 
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